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Abstract 
A multi-paradigm literature review methodology, ‘interplay’, is applied to alternative 
explanations of megaproject governance and performance. A two-fold categorisation of 
explanations, functionalist and interpretivist, is employed. The key insight is that despite 
important differences in epistemological orientation these two categories of explanation are 
essentially ‘performative’, which is expressed through a shared acceptance of the notion of 
actor farsightedness. This means that governance in megaprojects is primarily understood as 
static, convergent and patterned forms of organization (made order), while governance as 
discontinuous, divergent and fluctuating micro-processes of organizing is ignored. Having 
identified this explanatory gap, the article concludes with a call to refocus project governance 
research to include proper consideration of the multiple processes of organizing through 
which actors use, reproduce and transform governance as made order.  
Keywords: multi-paradigm review; paradigm interplay; functionalism; interpretivism; 
megaprojects; governance. 
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Introduction 
Project governance has been defined as ‘the complex process of steering multiple firms, 
agencies and organizations that are both operationally autonomous and structurally coupled 
in projects through various forms of reciprocal interdependencies’ (Miller and Floricel, 2000: 
135). This article uses multi-paradigm literature review to provide a comparative commentary 
on a sample of the wide variety texts addressing the topic of project governance. Multi-
paradigm review is chosen as a means of examining the literature in a particular research 
domain to consider the impact of researchers’ ‘underlying and often taken-for-granted 
assumptions on their understandings of organizational phenomena’ (Lewis and Grimes, 1999: 
673). Moreover, multi-paradigm reviews ‘may distinguish the value and limits of divergent 
perspectives’ (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002: 260) and thereby enhance our understanding of 
particularly complex and ambiguous phenomena.  
There has been a noticeable shift in the project management literature in recent years 
away from a narrow focus on the technical tasks necessary to deliver project outcomes 
towards a much greater interest in how the interactions between the multiple actors 
responsible for undertaking those tasks are organized and coordinated , in other words project 
governance (see, for example, Clegg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Miller and Lessard, 
2000; Pitsis et al., 2003; van Marrewijk et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2009; Winch, 2001, 
2009). Accompanying this shift, there has also been a more general increase of interest in 
projects as a means of organizing work. Projects and project management have been seen as a 
better way to achieve effective intra-organizational integration and optimal resource 
utilization (Cleland, 1997), to stimulate knowledge sharing, learning and creativity (Hansen 
et al., 1999; Hobday, 2000; Silver, 2000) and to control activities in turbulent environments 
(Ekstedt et al., 1999). Some have even described the expanding influence of projects as a 
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form and a process of organizing as the ‘projectification of society’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 
1999; Midler, 1995). This extension of project concepts and practices to the organization of 
work sensitizes us to the need to better appreciate the meanings and limitations of these 
concepts and practices (Söderlund, 2011). 
Rather than looking at the notion of projectification in general, however, our concern 
here is with governance in the context of an increasingly popular project form, the 
megaproject (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; van Marrewijk et al., 2008; Williams, 2009). This term 
describes very large-scale projects with a number of common characteristics deemed to create 
exceptional challenges for those involved. These characteristics include high levels of 
complexity along various dimensions (Remington and Pollack, 2007), the potential for 
significant conflicts of interest between the wide variety of public and private sector 
stakeholders (Alderman et al., 2005; Clegg et al., 2002), and the need to make decisions and 
to act under conditions of uncertainty as well as risk (Atkinson et al., 2006; Loch et al., 
2006). There is ample evidence that these challenges are proving somewhat intractable, 
leading in many cases to substantial cost overruns, delays in completion and failure to deliver 
against the objectives used to justify projects (see, for example, Atkinson, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 
2009; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2003; Miller and Lessard, 2000; NAO, 2006, 2009; Williams, 
2009). 
This article considers how a range of different writers explain the significant 
performance problems exhibited by many megaprojects, and examines their arguments about 
what is necessary to achieve better performance. It does not therefore engage with the small, 
but growing critical management literature on projects (cf. Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006), 
which tends to focus more on questions of emancipation than on performativity (Fournier and 
Grey, 2000). Rather than review explanations individually, however, the aim is to provide a 
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broad categorization of different types by using the notion of organization theory paradigms 
as an organizing principle and multi-paradigm literature review as a methodology. Rather 
than simply providing the substantive content of a literature review, then, the article examines 
and illustrates the analytical value of adopting a multi-paradigm approach.  
Other writers have pursued similar objectives in their reviews of the broader project 
management literature (Pollack, 2007; Söderlund, 2011), but the focus of these works has 
primarily been on the descriptive clustering of various contributions into distinct schools of 
thought. There is an implicit acknowledgement of paradigmatic differences between schools 
in terms of their ‘interest in describing or prescribing, and whether the published papers are 
primarily based on inductive or deductive research approaches’ (Söderlund, 2011, p. 165), 
but the implications of these differences, in terms for example of the scope for paradigm 
crossing, have not been fully explored. More importantly for the argument developed in this 
paper, however, there is no explicit reflection on what might be missing from the project 
management literature. Instead, the different schools of thought are described in terms of 
their epistemology, research foci, methodologies and dominant ideas. The possibility of 
shared lacunae, conceptual and empirical blind spots, remains unexplored. It is here that this 
paper makes one of its major contributions. 
Perhaps the best known framework of organization theory paradigms (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979) and the vigorous debate that it has stimulated are discussed in the next 
section. The strengths and limitations of multi-paradigm inquiry are also considered, and the 
review methodology adopted by this article, known as ‘paradigm interplay’ (Schultz and 
Hatch, 1996), is described and justified. Two broad types of explanation, functionalist and 
interpretivist, are identified and discussed in the subsequent section. 
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The key insight is that despite important differences in their epistemological 
orientation these two types of explanation are essentially ‘performative’ (Lyotard, 1984) in 
that their intention  is to better describe the dynamics within megaprojects so that they can be 
controlled more efficiently and effectively. A key expression of this interest in performativity 
is a shared acceptance, albeit conceived in different ways, of the notion of actor 
farsightedness. It is concluded that this allows these explanations to emphasize governance in 
megaprojects as static, convergent and patterned forms of organization, what Chia and Holt 
(2009) refer to as made order, and to ignore governance as discontinuous, divergent and 
fluctuating micro-processes of organizing (Law, 1992). By revealing this explanatory gap, the 
article recognizes the value of adopting the multi-paradigm notion of a ‘stratified ontology’, 
in which reality is at once made and in the making (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002; Reed, 1997). 
A call is made to refocus project governance research to include proper consideration of the 
multiple processes of organizing through which actors use, reproduce and transform 
governance as made order. 
 
Paradigms in Organization Theory and Multi-Paradigm Review 
The Paradigm Debate 
The notion that researchers studying organizations operate within different paradigms has a 
relatively long pedigree, going back over thirty years to the work of Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). They defined paradigms as clearly delineated sets of ideological and epistemological 
assumptions that guide various modes of organizational analysis. Their framework, illustrated 
in Figure 1, employs two dimensions to identify four paradigms of organization research: 
functionalism, interpretivism, radical structuralism, and radical humanism. 
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Figure 1: Paradigms of Organization Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
The horizontal dimension concerns epistemology. It describes a contrast between objective 
research that assumes the existence of ‘an external reality of deterministic and predictable 
relationships’ and subjective research that assumes knowledge to be about ‘contextually 
bound and fluid social constructions’ (Lewis and Grimes, 1999, pp. 673-674). The vertical 
dimension is about ideology or the knowledge interest of the research (Habermas, 1971). 
Regulatory research is intended to contribute to the prevailing social, economic or political 
order and assumes that this order is natural. In the context of management research this would 
mean a privileging of organizational performance and performance improvement. Radical 
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change research, on the other hand, is intended to challenge the prevailing order by focusing 
on the conflict and power asymmetries embedded within it, and to change it for the better by 
emancipating those whose interests are silenced or under-represented. This equates to the 
anti-performativity stance of critical management studies (Fournier and Grey, 2000). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) made a crucial contribution to the development of 
organization research by sensitizing researchers to the notion of paradigms, thereby 
legitimizing diverse alternatives to the functionalist mainstream (Scherer, 1998). Their work 
has also led, however, to a very vigorous debate about how best to address this diversity in 
the development of organization theory as a discipline. The various positions or camps in this 
debate have been discussed at length by a number of authors (see, for example, Hassard and 
Kelemen, 2002; Reed, 1985, 1992; Scherer, 1998; Schultz and Hatch, 1996). Although the 
terminology differs between authors, four main positions are typically identified: the 
protectionists, the integrationists, the postmodernists and the pluralists (Hassard and 
Kelemen, 2002). 
The protectionists support Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) argument that the four 
paradigms they identified are incommensurable, and that there should be no attempt to 
reconcile them or to create a conversation between them. Instead, each paradigm should be 
developed separately and according to its own epistemological rules. Jackson and Carter 
(1991, 1993), for example, defend the protectionist position on the basis of preventing the 
functionalist orthodoxy from colonising alternative modes of organizational enquiry. 
The integrationists take an equally forceful, but opposing position. Writers such as 
Donaldson (1985, 1996, 1998) and Pfeffer (1993, 1997) argue that the paradigm diversity 
which characterizes organisation theory is holding back rather than enhancing development 
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of the discipline. What is needed is a single dominant paradigm to give the discipline the 
necessary ‘scientific’ status. 
It is problematic to identify a clear postmodernist position on the paradigm debate, 
because the label postmodernism ‘spans numerous, often conflicting stances’ (Lewis and 
Kelemen, 2002, p. 256). Attempts have been made, however, to identify postmodern 
orientations towards ideology, ontology and epistemology (Chia, 1995; Cooper and Burrell, 
1988; Kilduff and Mehra, 1997). Using these insights, we can broadly position 
postmodernism as challenging modern research philosophies and practices on the basis that 
they are insufficiently reflexive and ignore the role of fluid and fragmented discourses in 
constituting how knowledge is produced and consumed (Deetz, 1996, 2000; Hassard and 
Kelemen, 2002).  
Finally, adherents to the pluralist or multi-paradigm position, the one adopted here, do 
not go as far as the postmodernist position, but do challenge paradigm incommensurability 
and argue in favour of various forms and techniques of crossing and communication between 
paradigms (see, for example, Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Hassard, 1991; Lewis and Grimes, 1999; 
Lewis and Kelemen, 2002; Schultz and Hatch, 1996; Weaver and Gioia, 1994; Willmott, 
1993). A core proposition is that there are degrees of commensurability between research 
paradigms, because while there are many significant contrasts, paradigms can also have a 
range of concepts, constructs and practices in common. Gioia and Pitre (1990, p. 587) refer to 
these common concepts and constructs as ‘transition zones’ and argue that a dialogue 
between paradigms through these zones is not only possible but necessary to produce ‘more 
comprehensive portraits of complex organizational phenomena.’ 
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The multi-paradigm perspective has, like the other positions, attracted its fair share of 
criticism. First, critics have argued that the perspective lacks an explicit philosophical 
framework with underpinning ideological, ontological and epistemological assumptions 
(Mingers, 1997; Scherer, 1998). This criticism is tackled head on by Lewis and Kelemen 
(2002) when they contrast the underpinning assumptions of multi-paradigm inquiry with 
those of modern (single paradigm) and postmodern approaches to research. They argue that 
multi-paradigm inquiry has: an ‘accommodating ideology’, which values divergent paradigm 
lenses; a ‘stratified ontology’, which assumes that ‘reality is at once made and in the making’; 
and a ‘pluralist epistemology’, which ‘rejects the notion of a single reference system in which 
we can establish truth’ (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002, p. 258). 
Second, critics have questioned the capacity of researchers to transcend the 
boundaries of their home paradigm. Multi-paradigm research is seen to produce shallow or 
contaminated readings and uses of approaches outside of the researcher’s favoured paradigm 
(Deetz, 1996; Parker and McHugh, 1991; Scherer, 1998). Supporters have responded by 
acknowledging that researchers cannot shed their paradigmatic predisposition, but that this 
does not prevent them from comparing and contrasting their assumptions, practices and 
insights with those of other paradigms (Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Lewis and Kelemen, 2002). 
The key feature of multi-paradigm inquiry in this context is that it encourages greater 
reflexivity (Brocklesby, 1997; Holland, 1999). 
Clearly then, the debate around paradigms in organization research is vigorous and 
one that is highly unlikely to be settled once and for all. Even if a generally acceptable 
resolution were possible, it is naïve to think that it would involve the complete abandonment 
of alternative paradigms as the integrationists propose, because ‘researchers need paradigms 
(or some other orientating device)’ (Schultz and Hatch, 1996, p. 553) in order to examine and 
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understand the various facets of complex organizational phenomena. Similarly, the 
isolationist position is being seen by many organization researchers as increasingly untenable 
given the rise of new forms of organization and new forms of knowing in a so-called post-
industrial world (Burrell, 1996; Weick, 1999). Greater reflexivity in research is being called 
for (Brocklesby, 1997; Hassard and Kelemen, 2002; Holland, 1999). The postmodernist 
position creates space for such reflexivity, but it also suggests that the notion of distinct 
paradigms of research should be abandoned and replaced with more fluid and provisional 
discourses. This article supports the call for greater reflexivity, but agrees with the pluralist 
position that paradigm distinctions need not be abandoned in order to achieve this aim. 
 
Multi-Paradigm Review 
Three distinct strategies of multi-paradigm inquiry have been identified: multi-paradigm 
review, multi-paradigm research, and meta-paradigm theory building (Lewis and Grimes, 
1999; Lewis and Kelemen, 2002). This article confines itself to the first strategy, multi-
paradigm review. In what follows we briefly discuss the objectives and limitations of this 
approach to literature review. We then describe the specific review methodology adopted 
here, the paradigm interplay technique proposed by Schultz and Hatch (1996). 
 The primary objective of multi-paradigm review is to encourage reflexivity by raising 
one’s paradigm consciousness. Lewis and Kelemen (2002, p. 261) argue that by ‘clarifying 
paradigm alternatives, researchers may compare their work to a wider realm of literature, 
recognize their theoretical predilections, and appreciate insights enabled by opposing 
viewpoints.’ Multi-paradigm review also provides an important means of coming to terms 
with a highly diverse and fragmented research literature, which addresses a complex and 
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ambiguous organizational phenomenon. The project governance literature is proposed here as 
having these characteristics (Söderlund, 2011). The aims of such a review are to explore the 
explanations contributed by different paradigms, and to reveal ‘the anomalies ignored and the 
facets distorted at the periphery’ of each paradigm (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002, p. 261). 
 Multi-paradigm review faces two main limitations. First, a reviewer faces a tension 
between respecting paradigm diversity, while simultaneously trying to avoid reinforcing 
paradigm distinctions (Ackroyd, 1992). Second, a reviewer needs to be careful not to 
privilege any particular paradigm, even though they will inevitably have their own 
paradigmatic preference (Donaldson, 1998). To address these limitations a review must 
emphasize that paradigm distinctions are sense-making heuristics useful for identifying 
alternative perspectives on an organizational phenomenon (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). A 
reviewer must also clearly acknowledge and remain acutely aware of their paradigm 
preference, and provide a balanced discussion of the insights and limitations of each 
paradigm with respect to the phenomenon in question. 
The review methodology adopted by this article combines paradigm bracketing and 
bridging (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). It draws on a technique called paradigm interplay first 
proposed by Schultz and Hatch (1996). The essence of paradigm interplay is that it respects 
paradigm distinctions (bracketing), while simultaneously exploring potential paradigm 
connections to generate new insights (bridging). Significantly, the technique was developed 
on the basis of only two of the four paradigms proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
functionalism and interpretivism. Schultz and Hatch (1996, p. 530-531) justify this on the 
grounds that ‘functionalism has been the dominant paradigm within organization theory’, 
while ‘interpretivism… in recent years has received increasing research attention.’ Moreover, 
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they note that restricting their discussion to two paradigms helps them ‘to develop the 
interplay strategy in an explicit way’ (Schultz and Hatch, 1996, p. 531).  
For the same reasons, this article will also use these two paradigms in developing its 
review. This will, of course, restrict our attention to those parts of the megaproject 
governance literature with a regulatory or performativity focus. This is not to deny that there 
are researchers applying a radical change or critical management focus to their work on 
projects (see, for example, Bresnen, 1996; Gill, 2002; Hodgson, 2002; Buckle and Thomas, 
2003; Hodgson, 2004; Thomas, 2006; Lindgren and Packendorff, 2006). Rather, the review 
presented here makes a conscious analytical choice to restrict its discussion to the 
functionalist paradigm, where the bulk of the literature on projects and megaproject 
governance is located, and the interpretivist paradigm, which has provided a growing number 
of more sociologically grounded accounts since the mid 1990s (Pollack, 2007; Söderlund, 
2011). Also, functionalist research represents the author’s home paradigm and is included in 
keeping with a desire to be reflexive. 
The basic elements of paradigm interplay are illustrated in Figure 2. Three key 
contrasts are identified on the basis of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework. These are 
in terms of the analytical framework, the mode of analysis, and the analytical processes 
applied by a researcher operating in each paradigm. 
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Figure 2: Contrasts and Connections between Functionalism and Interpretivism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functionalist research is carried out on the basis of a predefined and universal 
analytical framework. Interpretivist research, by contrast, is more about examining specific 
organizational contexts without prior theorization and allowing useful conceptual categories 
and constructs to emerge. Turning to the mode of analysis, functionalist research is targeted 
at gathering and categorising empirical data in terms of predefined variables, and then 
mapping the causal relationships between those variables to see if hypothesized relationships 
hold. Interpretivist research, by contrast, has a more associative mode of analysis, which 
explores the creation of meanings by actors in organizations and the ways in which those 
meanings can be associated and interpreted. Finally, functionalist research is about arriving at 
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an understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms at play by simplifying and clarifying 
complexity. In interpretivism, by contrast, the processes are about expanding and enriching 
the analysis by ‘constantly seeking more interpretations and making new associations’ 
(Schultz and Hatch, 1996, p. 539). 
 The three connections identified in Figure 2, flow from the application of a 
postmodernist critique to these two modernist paradigms. Postmodernists assume that ‘human 
existence is fragmented and discontinuous’ (Schultz and Hatch, 1996, p. 540), and that there 
is therefore no underlying sense of pattern or order to be discovered by researchers. In 
modernist paradigms, by contrast, researchers are concerned with discovering underlying 
patterns in order to ascribe causal relationships (functionalism) or to bring meaning to 
complex organizational phenomena (interpretivism). Postmodernists also argue that research 
should not be about a search for some hidden underlying essence, but rather it should focus 
on the ‘superficial and the unexpected’ (Burrell, 1988, p. 225), because that is all there is. 
Research in the functionalist and interpretivist paradigms, by contrast, is about a search for 
the essence of organizational phenomena, ‘the underlying assumptions or meanings believed 
to order human experience’ (Schultz and Hatch, 1996, p. 541).  
Finally, postmodernism stresses the temporary, discontinuous and indeterminate 
character of organizational phenomena. It has an ontology of becoming rather than being, 
which focuses attention on processes as opposed to organizational structures and entities 
(Cooper and Burrell, 1988). Functionalist and interpretivist researchers, by contrast, tend to 
offer more or less static representations of organizational phenomena that ignore the flux and 
discontinuity of everyday organizational life. Where change processes are included in an 
analysis they are represented either as a relatively predictable movement from one static state 
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of being to another or as interrelated, cyclical and ordered processes of sense-making and 
meaning creation. 
 
Paradigm Interplay in the Literature on Megaproject Governance 
Text selection 
We now use the paradigm interplay technique to review a sample of texts focused on 
megaproject governance. In contrast to those papers reviewing much larger numbers of texts 
to provide an overview and categorization of the broader literature on project management 
(see, for example, Crawford et al., 2006; Pollack, 2007; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007; Söderlund, 
2011), the objective here was simply to choose example texts addressing megaproject 
governance from within the functionalist and interpretivist paradigms to demonstrate the 
application and value of multi-paradigm literature review. 
The selection process was a version of snowball sampling, where an initial set of key 
data sources suggest and lead onto further data sources (Scarbrough et al., 2004). The 
snowball sampling process began with the comprehensive literature review paper by 
Söderlund (2011), which identifies seven schools of project management research. Three of 
these, the Governance, Contingency and Behaviour Schools, were identified as being 
particularly relevant based on their main research focus and their implicit epistemological 
orientation. All three of these schools are concerned with questions of how projects are 
organized, coordinated or governed. According to Söderlund (2011), papers within the 
Governance and Contingency Schools, favour the testing of hypotheses derived deductively 
from predefined theories, which suggests that they are functionalist in their epistemological 
orientation. Literature in the Governance School draws primarily on agency or transaction 
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cost theories (see, for example, Hart and Moore, 1999; Williamson, 1996), while the 
Contingency School is grounded in theories linking organizational design and structure to 
environmental and task characteristics (see, for example, Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). Papers categorized within the Behaviour School, by contrast, are concerned 
with documenting the emergent processes within projects of ‘trust-building, problem-solving, 
sense-making and learning’ (Söderlund, 2011, p. 162). This suggests that they are broadly 
interpretivist in their approach to research. 
Based on the application of a number of search terms to titles, keywords and abstracts, 
four key articles were identified from amongst those categorized by Söderlund (2011) in the 
Governance, Contingency and Behaviour Schools. The search terms used were: 
‘megaprojects’, ‘large-scale projects’, ‘major projects’, ‘complex projects’, ‘governance’, 
‘risk’, ‘uncertainty’,  and ‘performance’. Performance was included as a search term to focus 
attention on those texts with a regulatory bias and to screen out the critical management 
literature. The author names and reference lists of these four articles were then used to 
identify further relevant texts. This process of snowball sampling continued through two 
further iterations until it was decided, based on evidence of substantial cross-referencing and 
the logic of conceptual saturation (Guest et al., 2006), that a continued search was unlikely to 
generate further new leads. The final result of this sampling process is shown in Table 1, 
where the selected texts are categorised into three broad strands of research associated with 
the Governance, Contingency and Behaviour Schools respectively. 
 
Arguments and Conclusions1 
                                                            
1 This section draws on The Author (2011). 
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Before moving to a detailed discussion of paradigm contrasts and connections, the core 
arguments and conclusions advanced by each strand of research are briefly described. Table 1 
presents a summary. 
 The first strand of functionalist research argues that performance is often 
disappointing, because non-viable projects are so regularly undertaken (Davidson and Huot, 
1989; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2003, 2005; Wachs, 1989, 1990). It suggests 
that those actors with a vested interest in seeing projects undertaken, typically politicians and 
contractors, engage in strategic rent-seeking behaviour to get projects approved and to win 
associated contracts. This takes the form of systematically under-estimating project costs, 
over-estimating project benefits and being over-optimistic with project scheduling. These 
under and over-estimates are not seen as an honest mistake or a function of poor technical 
skills and inadequate data. Rather, they are attributed to straightforward ‘deception and lying 
as tactics aimed at getting projects started’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, p. 47).
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Table 1: Alternative Explanations of Megaproject Governance and Performance  
    
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
Functionalist Explanation 1 
Weak Institutional 
Safeguards (Governance) 
Functionalist Explanation 2 
Misaligned and Underdeveloped 
Governance (Contingency)
Interpretivist Explanation     
Diverse Project Cultures and 
Rationalities (Behaviour)
Arguments 
Conclusions 
Sample 
 Texts 
Weak institutional safeguards and warped 
incentives mean that project promoters 
and contractors regularly engage in 
intentional rent-seeking behaviour (under-
estimating costs, over-estimating benefits) 
to get non-viable projects approved 
Better performance depends on legal 
requirement for thorough ex ante risk 
analysis and management plan; limit role of 
politicians to formulating and auditing 
public interest objectives; various ex ante 
measures to improve accountability of 
project decision-making 
Davidson and Huot 1989; Flyvbjerg 
2009; Flyvbjerg et al. 2002, 2003, 2005; 
Wachs 1989, 1990 
Performance problems result from 
misaligned or underdeveloped 
governance arrangements incapable of 
handling the emergent turbulence and 
opportunistic behaviour inevitably 
associated with megaprojects 
Better performance requires conscious 
design and creation at the front-end of 
the project of mechanisms that enhance 
ex post governability; mechanisms must 
be appropriate to the particular context of 
the project  
De Meyer et al. 2002; Loch et al. 2006; 
Miller and Hobbs 2009; Miller and 
Lessard 2000; Morris 2009; Winch 2001, 
2009; Winch et al. 2000 
Projects are subject to processes of social 
construction and characterized by diverse 
and often competing cultures and 
rationalities – performance problems result 
from normal day-to-day management 
practice
Good performance facilitated by ‘future 
perfect thinking’ and conscious design 
and creation at the front-end of the 
project of a shared culture supported by 
governance mechanisms to encourage 
collaborative and coordinated behaviour 
Alderman et al. 2005; Atkinson et al. 
2006; Clegg et al. 2002, 2006; Pitsis et 
al. 2003; van Marrewijk et al. 2008
 
 
20 
 
 
These authors argue that such rent-seeking behaviour is encouraged, because the 
incentives to produce over-optimistic estimates of project viability are very strong and the 
disincentives relatively weak. Given the very lengthy time-frames that apply to megaproject 
development and implementation, there is a lack of proper accountability for project 
promoters, typically politicians, because they are often not in office when the actual viability 
of a project can be assessed. Getting a project approved will deliver significant political 
capital in the short-term, however. Similarly, it is argued that the accountability of contractors 
for their behaviour is weak, because the contractual penalties for producing over-optimistic 
tenders are often low compared to the potential profits involved (Davidson and Huot, 1989; 
Wachs, 1990). The key solution to project performance problems, then, is to create well 
defined policies and procedures and to embed them in institutional structures that strengthen 
the accountability of key project actors. This might include a legal requirement for a thorough 
ex ante risk analysis and management plan, limiting the role of politicians to formulating and 
auditing public interest objectives, and various ex ante measures to improve the 
accountability of project decision-making (see, for example, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, pp. 107-
124). 
The second strand of functionalist research argues that the underperformance of many 
megaprojects is best explained by the presence of inappropriate or underdeveloped 
governance arrangements that are incapable of handling the turbulence inevitably associated 
with these endeavours (De Meyer et al., 2002; Loch et al., 2006; Miller and Hobbs, 2009; 
Miller and Lessard, 2000; Morris, 2009; Winch, 2009; Winch et al., 2000). The complexity, 
scope and scale, and the long time frames of megaprojects are seen as major reasons for the 
significant turbulence experienced in most cases. Turbulence is seen to originate either from 
 
 
21 
 
exogenous events in the broader macroeconomic, political, social and natural environments, 
or from endogenous events within and between the organizations directly involved in a 
project t. In the latter case, emphasis is placed on contractual disputes and the breakdown of 
partnerships or alliances. The principal set of solutions focuses, therefore, on the ex ante 
design of governance mechanisms. This is described as ‘planning for the journey rather than 
planning the journey’ (Miller and Lessard, 2000, p. 203). Broadly speaking, these governance 
mechanisms are intended to build stronger, more cooperative and more flexible relationships 
between project participants. Examples might include an alliance ownership structure, 
combining balanced equity positions with a strong leader; financial guarantees from 
government to support project financiers; rendezvous clauses making it possible to 
renegotiate contracts; integrated project teams with financial incentives to stimulate 
innovation; and multiple sources of finance to diversify dependencies (Loch et al., 2006; 
Miller and Floricel, 2000; Miller and Hobbs, 2009). There is also an explicit recognition that 
the governance mechanisms selected and designed must be appropriate to the particular 
context and characteristics of a project (De Meyer et al., 2002; Miller and Floricel, 2000; 
Winch, 2009). 
Finally, the interpretivist strand of research argues that megaprojects are characterized 
as a matter of course by multiple and diverse cultures and rationalities rather than by a 
singular, shared rationality as is assumed by more orthodox, functionalist perspectives 
(Atkinson et al., 2006; Clegg et al., 2002, 2006; Pitsis et al., 2003; van Marrewijk et al., 
2008). This means that different actors understand inputs to and outputs from the project in 
very different, incomplete and often competing ways. For example, the contractual 
documents and other boundary objects used to define and coordinate the roles and 
responsibilities of the project actors are often highly ambiguous in meaning (Alderman et al., 
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2005) and provide substantial scope for ‘language games’ leading to ‘contested action in 
complex, inter-organizational and professional disputes’ (van Marrewijk et al., 2008, p. 592). 
The performance problems of many megaprojects are an almost inevitable result, then, of the 
normal day-to-day practice of managers trying to cope with an organizational environment 
that is complex, ambiguous and often highly conflictual. The focus here is said to be 
contextually grounded, looking in detail at actual practice within project organizations. As 
van Marrewijk et al. (2008, p. 592) comment, ‘[t]his approach recognises that project 
environments are subject to processes of social construction, in which participants construct a 
more or less stable working environment for themselves’. It is concluded that where project 
participants are able to construct a relatively stable environment, which promotes peaceful 
cooperation between differing cultures, there is a greater chance of good project performance. 
An example of one such stable working environment is identified in research on a 
project to build a 20 kilometre long tunnel under the area north of Sydney Harbour in the run 
up to the Olympic Games in 2000 (Clegg et al., 2002, 2006; Pitsis et al., 2003; van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008). This research links the broadly successful delivery of the project to 
the decision at the beginning of the process to create ‘a project culture that was explicitly 
designed and crafted to encourage shared behaviours, decision-making, and values’ (Pitsis et 
al., 2003, p. 576). A number of governance mechanisms were used to underpin this project 
culture, including a formal statement of key values as a basis for resolving disputes internally 
and a risk/reward regime based on monetized key performance indictors (KPIs).  The 
institutional element of project governance – the Project Alliance Leadership Team (PALT) – 
was explicitly created to be legally and spatially separate from the four parent organizations. 
The intention was ‘to produce a designer culture for the project rather than have it as an arena 
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in which the various project organizations’ cultures fought for dominance’ (van Marrewijk et 
al., 2008, p. 595). 
In addition, based on observations from meetings of the PALT the researchers arrived 
at the idea that the project was being managed through what they call a ‘future perfect 
strategy’ (Pitsis et al., 2003). It is suggested that managers dealt with the pressure to deliver 
an innovative project outcome in circumstances of extreme complexity, ambiguity and 
uncertainty by combining a forward looking projection of desired ends with a visualization of 
the means to achieve that projected future. This is differentiated from scenario planning on 
the basis that it is emergent and subject to constant revision rather than being explicitly 
scripted and grounded in past expectations (Pitsis et al., 2003). It is argued that the formal 
statement of collaborative values and monetized KPIs enshrined in the designer culture acted 
as powerful incentives, driving participants in the project to ‘think creatively and laterally to 
come up with solutions considered best for the project rather than merely to implement 
second-best solutions already known from previous projects’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 577). 
 
Contrasts between Functionalist and Interpretivist Explanations 
Having established the basic content of these three explanations, we now discuss the 
fundamental epistemological contrasts between those operating in the functionalist paradigm 
and that located in the interpretivist paradigm. Table 2 summarizes the three key contrasts. 
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Table 2: Contrasts between Functionalist and Interpretivist Explanations 
Dimension Functionalist Explanations Interpretivist Explanation 
Analytical Framework Predefined and Generalized
Research guided by models 
and constructs derived from 
organization theory, in 
particular agency and 
contingency perspectives 
Studies of multiple projects 
across geography and time 
Emergent and Specific 
Useful explanatory constructs 
and categories emerge from 
the research process 
Explanation focused on 
creation of meaning driving 
action in a specific project 
context 
Mode of Analysis Categorical 
Data gathering focused on 
populating predefined 
categories and variables 
Aim to discover causal 
relations between variables 
Associative 
Data gathering focused on 
discovering and interpreting 
meanings and exploring the 
associations between them 
Analytical Processes Convergent 
Explanations seek to 
condense and simplify the 
various dimensions of the 
megaproject phenomenon to 
produce a clearer and more 
generalized representation 
Divergent 
Explanation seeks to expand 
analysis beyond initial focus 
to produce a deeper and 
richer understanding of the 
specific project 
 
Framework adapted from Schultz and Hatch (1996) 
 
 
Looking at the analytical framework contrast, it is recognized that the two 
functionalist explanations are operating on the basis of predefined theoretical constructs, 
which are used to structure and direct the attention of researchers and to facilitate 
generalization of the research process to a number of megaprojects. Miller and Lessard 
(2000), for example, report research findings from sixty large engineering projects, while 
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Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) discuss and analyse several hundred large projects. Both explanations 
focus their attention on institutional matters, because they are consciously drawing on 
streams of organization theory, in particular agency theory (Hart and Moore, 1999) and 
contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973). Consequently, both make a number of predetermined 
assumptions about actors, in particular that they are opportunistic and exhibit a maximizing 
form of bounded rationality, and about the way in which institutional structures shape and 
constrain actor behaviour. 
 The interpretivist explanation, by contrast, is characterized by the emergence of case-
specific theoretical constructs generated through reflection and interpretation during the 
process of analysis. The research team which studied the Sydney Harbour tunnel project, for 
example, entered the research domain simply with a broad agenda of ‘seeking to understand, 
describe, and analyze how collaborative quality was able to occur in a project’ (Pitsis et al., 
2003, p. 575). It was only by gathering and interpreting the case data that the concept of 
‘future perfect strategy’ (Pitsis et al., 2003) and the idea of the project’s various governance 
mechanisms as a ‘designer culture’ (Clegg et al., 2002) started to emerge. The researchers are 
also keen to emphasize the case specificity of these constructs. For example, commenting on 
the concept of future perfect strategy they say ‘it became obvious to us that the uniqueness of 
the project had a created a unique concentration on the temporal aspects in the strategic 
management of the project’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 578). 
 Next, looking at the mode of analysis contrast we can see that the two functionalist 
explanations have a categorical approach. Both strands of research are conducted on the basis 
of matching empirical data to predetermined variables, derived from an over-arching 
theoretical framework, in order to discover if the proposed causal linkages are supported. 
Functionalist explanation 1 proposes that a significant proportion of poor megaproject 
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performance is caused by weak institutional/contractual safeguards, which allow 
opportunistic, rent-seeking behaviour leading to the regular approval of non-viable projects. 
Flyvbjerg (2009) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) suggest that this neat causal chain accounts well, 
and better than alternative technical or psychological explanations, for the systematic 
underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits found in their data. Functionalist 
explanation 2 proposes a similarly neat causal relationship between inadequate or misaligned 
governance mechanisms, various forms of endogenous and exogenous turbulence, and poor 
project performance. Loch et al. (2006, p. 220), for example, argue that ‘when unexpected 
changes occur partners are affected differently, invalidating carefully tuned contractual 
agreements, and the project inevitably falls apart.’ 
 The interpretivist explanation, by contrast, is much more associative and focused on 
meanings rather than causes in its mode of analysis. As Clegg et al. (2002) emphasize, their 
interest in the meaning and practices of ‘governmentality’ in the designer culture of the 
Sydney Harbour tunnel project resulted in a study of ‘artefacts’ (photographs of the research 
sites, banners, vision and mission statements) to complement findings from the more 
traditional research tools, such as interviews and questionnaires. Similarly, Pitsis et al. (2003) 
arrived at the concept of ‘future perfect strategy’ by drawing an association between repeated 
references in project leadership team meetings to temporal issues. They paid particular 
attention to the way in which ‘managers sometimes projected events, actions and behaviour 
that had not yet occurred into the future as if they had already occurred and were lying in the 
past’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 578). 
 In the final dimension of contrast, analytical processes, we can see that the two 
functionalist explanations are highly convergent in their approach. Both strands of research 
are focused on condensing and simplifying a complex picture of the megaproject 
 
 
27 
 
phenomenon in order to create a more ordered representation. Both employ prior theorization 
of the research domain to identify key concepts and explanatory categories and then use this 
to focus and narrow their narrative. Functionalist explanation 1 uses the central concept of 
opportunistic estimation bias as a focus for its argument and as way of bringing together data 
from several hundred projects dispersed both geographically and longitudinally. Explanation 
2, similarly, uses the central concepts of project turbulence and governability as key foci in 
the development of its argument and as a way of drawing together empirical data from a wide 
variety of projects across the world. 
 The interpretivist explanation, by contrast, takes a more divergent approach to 
analysis, opening up and exploring new avenues of enquiry as the research proceeds to 
generate a richer and more detailed understanding of the domain. Clegg et al. (2002) and 
Pitsis et al. (2003) emphasize that the Sydney Harbour tunnel research began as an attempt to 
understand the nature of collaboration and governmentality represented by the project 
alliance leadership team (PALT). The focus of the research began to diverge, however, as the 
interview data and meeting notes were coded and interpreted and began to reveal insights into 
what became known as ‘future perfect strategy’. 
 To sum up then, this discussion of paradigm contrasts has sought to illustrate that 
these two bodies of megaproject governance research proceed from very different 
epistemological foundations. The functionalist explanations operate on the basis of an etic 
epistemology. This involves taking an outsider’s view of the objective reality of projects and 
megaproject governance, and looking for evidence to test causal linkages in explanations that 
can be generalized to a range cases. The interpretivist explanation, by contrast, is based on an 
emic epistemology. This assumes that to achieve a proper understanding of megaproject 
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governance one must take a contextually grounded, insider’s view of the socially constructed 
reality in specific situations, looking at the meanings created by actors. 
These different ways of knowing about project governance reflect deeper differences 
in knowing about the wider social world in which projects are embedded. Of particular 
interest here are the fundamentally different assumptions made by these two bodies of 
research about what we can know about the nature of the future. This is of interest, because it 
concerns one of the quintessential questions of project management, and management more 
generally (Pitsis et al., 2003), namely how to make decisions in the present that will deliver 
desired and valued outcomes in the future. The way in which this question is answered by 
these explanations gives a clear indication of their epistemological assumptions concerning 
decision-maker knowledge about the future. 
Both functionalist explanations argue that the successful delivery of a project requires 
ex ante preparation for the future in the form of pre-designed governance mechanisms that 
can cope with events that have not yet happened. Both explanations also accept, however, 
that many future events in the context of a complex megaproject are likely to be 
unpredictable. That is, rather than simply being risky and therefore amenable to calculations 
of probability, many project events and outcomes are uncertain (Knight, 1921). The way 
these explanations overcome this seeming paradox is to assume that the uncertainty attached 
to the future is primarily, although not entirely, characterized by what has been called 
foreseeable uncertainty (De Meyer et al., 2002; Loch et al., 2006). 
 This suggests that managers can use their past experience of projects to specify a 
range of possible future outcomes. The probability of each outcome occurring cannot be 
calculated, because there is a lack of suitable reference class data, but managers are assumed 
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to be able to use beliefs or expectations grounded in historical practice to estimate their 
likelihood (Knight, 1921; Samset, 2009). It is on the basis of such estimates, that the ex ante 
design of governance mechanisms relies. This is not deny that some contributors to these 
functionalist explanations do recognize the existence of some unforeseeable uncertainty, 
where past experience does not exist or is not a good guide to the future (see, for example, De 
Meyer et al., 2002; Loch et al., 2006). The key point is that the conceptions of project 
governance promoted by these explanations are grounded primarily in assumptions that what 
we can know about the future is characterized either by risk or by foreseeable uncertainty. 
The interpretivist explanation, by contrast, suggests that the successful completion of 
the project in the specific case considered was only partly a function of a consciously pre-
designed culture intended to encourage collaborative working. A significant part of the 
explanation focuses on the notion of future perfect strategy, which emerged as the research 
progressed and the case data were interpreted. Future perfect strategy was understood by the 
researchers as being significantly different to the kind of scenario planning techniques often 
associated with projects facing high degrees of ambiguity and uncertainty. It was not based 
on the use of past experience to identify and plan for the achievement of possible future 
scenarios in the project. Rather, the strategy ‘comprised imagining a future and then seeking 
to realize it, subject to constant revision’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 576).  
This suggests that, in the context of this project at least, the interpretivist explanation 
conceives of knowledge about the future as being significantly characterized by 
unforeseeable uncertainty, which is in tune with the socially constructed nature of knowledge 
in this paradigm. The future is seen as a created process shaped by the nature and pattern of 
decisions made now and in the future (Froud, 2003; Minsky, 1996). The interpretivist 
explanation does recognize that governance mechanisms can be pre-designed, as the designer 
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culture in the case demonstrates, and that this process of institutionalization might shape the 
future of the project in a broad sense. The emphasis is much more, however, on the need to 
continuously revise activities as the project emerges in unforeseeable ways over time. 
 
Connections between Functionalist and Interpretivist Explanations 
We turn now to the other component of paradigm interplay, to discuss what is revealed by an 
examination of connections between these different types of explanation. As Schultz and 
Hatch (1996) did, we use a postmodernist style of thinking to establish and examine these 
connections. It should be emphasized that the author is not a postmodernist, but is 
pragmatically assuming this perspective in line with the reflexive philosophy of multi-
paradigm review. Connections are identified on the basis that both functionalist and 
interpretivist explanations are concerned with identifying an ordered pattern and an 
underlying essence in the failures and successes of megaprojects. We also identify a 
connection based on the common use of static representations of project governance. The 
core argument put forward on the basis of these connections is that there is an acceptance 
within both paradigms of the notion of actor farsightedness. Table 3 summarizes the key 
aspects of the discussion. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Connections between Functionalist and Interpretivist Explanations 
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Connecting Assumptions Functionalist Explanations Interpretivist Explanation 
Underlying Pattern Project failure explained by an 
underlying pattern of weak or 
misaligned governance 
mechanisms/institutions, and 
success explained by a reverse 
pattern 
 
Failure associated with 
conflict between different, 
but coherent 
cultures/rationalities within 
the project domain, and 
success associated with an 
integrative culture promoting 
collaborative working 
Underlying Essence Actor farsightedness based on a 
future characterized largely by 
risk and knowable uncertainty 
 
Actor farsightedness in the 
project domain, with 
certainty created in situ on an 
iterative basis 
Static Representation Governance as predesigned 
institutions, mechanisms, 
contracts, coalitions, alliances, 
relationships, and risk 
management plans with inherent 
flexibility 
 
Governance as designer 
culture, project alliance 
leadership team, statements 
of vision and values, KPIs, 
and future perfect strategy 
based on coherent stepwise 
revision 
 
Framework adapted from Schultz and Hatch (1996) 
 
 
The suggestion that both types of explanation have a modernist concern with identifying 
ordered and coherent patterns is evidenced by the way they discuss the reasons for 
megaproject success and failure. Functionalist explanation 1 sees project failure as a function 
of coherent and strategically organized ex ante opportunism facilitated by weak 
institutional/contractual safeguards. The theoretical explanation or grand narrative (Lyotard, 
1984) of failure is one of regular and systematic cheating by project sponsors and other key 
actors with an interest in seeing projects approved. The narrative of improvement, a call to 
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design better institutional safeguards, is similarly coherent and ordered. Functionalist 
explanation 2 provides an equally patterned picture of project failure, seeing it as a function 
of poor or misaligned governance. The grand narrative suggests that project actors make poor 
governance choices, but that they can learn to do better. 
Finally, the interpretivist explanation sees failure as a function of the inherent 
difficulties posed by the social construction of projects, and the almost inevitable conflict that 
occurs between the different cultures and rationalities that emerge from that social 
construction. At first sight, this explanation appears much less concerned with order and 
coherence given its emphasis on conflict as a normal part of organizational life. Even here, 
though, there is a search for pattern. A project a may contain different and competing 
cultures, but each is seen as coherent. Conflict may occur, but the rules of engagement and 
resolution are ordered and coherent. Power resources or an appeal to collaborative principles 
and values will settle the matter (Clegg et al., 2002; van Marrewijk et al., 2008). 
Looking at the way these explanations discuss megaproject failure and success, we 
can also identify a modernist interest in treating observable phenomena as a reflection of a 
deeper underlying essence. In functionalist explanation 1, for example, project failure is not 
simply about the observable existence of weak institutional safeguards, which facilitate 
opportunistic behaviour. It is also about that deeper characteristic of the human condition that 
enables actors to undertake regular and systematic cheating. This explanation suggests that 
project sponsors and others are able to calculate the likely future path of a project, based on 
data from previous similar projects, and therefore could produce an appropriate and 
comprehensive plan of action and associated governance structures and contractual 
documents to ensure a successful outcome. Knowledge about the future is primarily 
characterized by risk and foreseeable uncertainty. The reason for failure, therefore, is that 
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these key actors consciously choose not to use this ability and instead opportunistically 
misrepresent the future path of the project, in terms of costs, benefits, and schedule, to serve 
their own interests. The underlying essence for this explanation, then, is actor farsightedness. 
Evidence of an appeal to the same underlying essence can be seen in the second 
functionalist explanation. As in the first, knowledge about the future is characterized 
primarily by risk and foreseeable uncertainty. This suggests that actors should be able to look 
ahead and discern potential sources of turbulence and design appropriate governance 
mechanisms to deal with them. Project failure, it is argued, is not simply about the observable 
existence of misaligned or inappropriate governance arrangements, which cannot cope with 
the various sources of turbulence that emerge over time. It is also about the fact that 
governance design is a management choice, which can be undertaken well or badly. When it 
is done badly, and the project fails, this is taken as a failure of actor farsightedness. Project 
success, which is explained by the observable existence of aligned and appropriate 
governance, is essentially therefore a function of farsightedness. 
Perhaps more surprisingly there is also evidence of an appeal to actor farsightedness 
in the interpretivist explanation, which might be expected to reject this underlying essence 
given its assumption that knowledge about the future is socially constructed and therefore 
significantly characterized by unforeseeable uncertainty. What we see here, however, is that 
actor farsightedness remains essential to this explanation’s grand narrative, albeit differently 
conceived. At the observable level, the failure of projects is seen as a function of conflict 
between different cultures and rationalities. Project success, by extension, is linked to the 
creation of a mechanism by one or more actors that mediates between these competing 
cultures and encourages (positive) collaboration instead of (negative) conflict. Looking 
beyond the observable level of explanation, we suggest that the very existence of such a 
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mechanism requires an essence of actor farsightedness. Rather than being conceived in a 
temporal sense, however, farsightedness is conceived here as being able to look 
comprehensively across the project domain in order to recognize and understand the range of 
different cultures and rationalities. Such recognition and understanding would seem to be the 
prerequisites of creating an effective integrative governance mechanism. The explanation of 
future perfect strategy appeals to the same essence of actor farsightedness in the project 
domain. Imagining a future outcome and then seeking to realize it, subject to constant 
revision, suggests an appreciation, continually updated, of what is and what is not happening 
within the project domain. 
The final modernist connection between these functionalist and interpretivist 
explanations is their reliance on static representations of governance. Governance is 
represented largely in terms of structural characteristics of coherence, pattern and order, 
seeing it as a form of organization. The idea of governance as dynamic and potentially 
disordered processes of organizing is downplayed or completely ignored. So, for example, 
the functionalist explanations talk about governance in terms of mechanisms, institutions, 
relationships, alliances, contracts, coalitions, risk management plans and so on. There is a 
strong emphasis on the notion of governance design and an assumption that much, if not all, 
of this design work can be, and indeed should be, done at the front-end of the project before 
turbulence and opportunism arise (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Loch et al., 2006; Miller and 
Lessard, 2000; Williams et al., 2009). The possibility of changes or discontinuity in project 
governance is downplayed by references to flexibility by design or infusing governability 
(Miller and Hobbs, 2009). This ex ante governance design relies heavily, of course, on the 
underlying essence of actor farsightedness. 
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The interpretivist explanation also represents governance in largely static terms, with 
its references to a coherent designer culture embodied in the project alliance leadership team 
(PALT), a list of value statements, and monetized key performance indicators (Clegg et al., 
2002; Pitsis et al., 2003). As a potential counterpoint to this, the researchers’ description of 
future perfect strategy as a ‘process [that] comprised imagining a future and then seeking to 
realize it, subject to constant revision’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 576) does suggest some interest 
in representing project governance in processual terms. On closer inspection, however, it 
becomes clear that this process is being described in essentially static terms, as an orderly and 
coherent series of steps towards the imagined end goal. Problems emerge, discussions 
happen, a revising step takes place. As Schultz and Hatch (1996, p. 543) observe, 
interpretivists evince a strong interest in processes of sense making and meaning creation 
within organizations, but, as in this case, they rarely examine ‘the ruptures, discontinuity, and 
fragmentation’ involved. Chia (1995, p. 587) makes very much the same point when he 
suggests that ‘when modernists talk about process, they usually mean the various 
stages/states of isolatable events/conditions which lead towards an achievement or outcome’ 
[emphasis in the original]. Again, this coherent and ordered representation relies on an 
essence of actor farsightedness in the project domain. 
 
Conclusion: Seeing Beyond Governance as Made Order 
Through a literature review based on paradigm interplay (Schultz and Hatch, 1996), this 
article has discussed a number of important contrasts and connections between two bodies of 
megaproject governance research, one functionalist and one interpretivist. The use of 
paradigm interplay as a review technique enables significant reflexivity through a 
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combination of paradigm bracketing and bridging. Bracketing is about considering the 
implications of different epistemological assumptions for the kinds of understanding which 
are made possible by different paradigms. In this way, paradigms are seen as partial sense-
making heuristics, focusing our attention on certain facets of complex organizational or social 
phenomena and obscuring others (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002). Bridging challenges the notion 
of incommensurability and seeks out the assumptions, concepts, and constructs that 
paradigms have in common (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). Paradigm interplay applies a 
postmodern style of thinking (Chia, 1995) to identify these connections, but retains an 
acceptance of the value of paradigm distinctions. The aim is to uncover which facets of a 
phenomenon are ignored or not adequately explained by either paradigm as a consequence of 
these shared assumptions and constructs. 
The key common assumption identified by the literature review is that actors engaged 
in megaprojects are farsighted. In a broad sense, this means that all three explanations accept 
that actors can and should prepare for the future before it has happened. Having said that, 
conceptions of what it means to be farsighted do differ between the functionalist and 
interpretivist explanations. This is unsurprising given their different epistemological 
assumptions about what can be known about the nature of the future. 
Farsightedness for the functionalist explanations is conceived in a temporal sense. So, 
functionalist explanation 1, which assumes that future events and project outcomes are 
primarily risky and therefore susceptible to detailed analysis and contingency planning, 
argues that actors can and should undertake comprehensive ex ante contracting and thereby 
control the future. Functionalist explanation 2 assumes that project outcomes are in most 
cases foreseeably uncertain. This means that decision-makers lack the necessary reference 
class data to undertake a calculation of statistical probability, but experience and judgement 
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still allow actors to be farsighted enough to know the range of possible future events, to rank 
them based on subjective probability, and therefore to prepare appropriate governance 
arrangements ex ante to manage those events ex post. 
The interpretivist explanation appears to present an interesting paradox. On one hand 
it assumes that projects take place in an environment of unforeseeable uncertainty – 
knowledge about future outcomes is socially constructed and therefore unknowable in the 
present. Farsightedness thus appears to be ruled out. On the other it suggests that ex post 
problems can be more effectively addressed if a collaborative project culture is consciously 
designed ex ante, and future perfect thinking is used to imagine project outcomes which are 
then achieved through stepwise revision of activities. This seeming paradox is resolved, then, 
by an acceptance of actor farsightedness, but conceived in this case as project domain 
farsightedness. 
Given this shared assumption, all three of these explanations are able to conceive 
governance in megaprojects as static, convergent and patterned forms of organization, what 
Chia and Holt (2009) refer to as made order, and to ignore governance as discontinuous, 
divergent and fluctuating micro-processes of organizing (Law 1992).  The argument here is 
that an assumption of farsightedness provides a convenient conceptual short-cut, which 
bypasses a serious consideration of the perhaps haphazard, transient and accidental processes 
through which actors use, reproduce and transform this made order on an on-going basis. 
There is, of course, recognition that actors might consciously choose to renegotiate the terms 
of governance during a project, but this simply represents the replacement of one made order 
with another.  
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The core conclusion, then, is that future research must give greater attention to 
governance as micro-processes of organizing within projects. Structural forms of governance 
dominant the functionalist explanations reviewed here. The interpretivist explanation evinces 
a concern with ‘everyday organizational life’ (Pitsis et al., 2003, p. 588), but presents an 
ordered, coherent and static picture of that life. Both types of explanation operate on the basis 
of a modernist ontology. This is not a call, however, simply to replace a modernist ontology 
of being with a postmodern ontology of becoming (Cooper and Law, 1995). As Linehan and 
Kavanagh (2006, p. 52) insightfully comment, ‘each ontology is necessarily partial…an 
excessive attachment to one or the other leads to a privileging of some questions, methods 
and interventions, and a marginalisation of others.’ Rather, this article supports the 
accommodating philosophy of multi-paradigm inquiry, valuing alternative paradigm lenses 
for their capacity to ‘reveal seemingly disparate, but interdependent facets of complex 
phenomena’ (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002, p. 258). Söderlund (2011, p. 168) reaches a similar 
conclusion, arguing that the pluralism of project management research needs to be embraced 
‘to illuminate the complex actuality of projects and project management practice.’ Similarly, 
Pollack (2007, p. 272) concludes that a ‘wider variety of paradigms employed within the field 
increases the ways in which existing techniques are understood.’ These papers seem to 
assume, however, that each piece of the jigsaw is already available and that they need only to 
be properly assembled to provide a holistic understanding of projects. The key difference and 
contribution here is that this paper has used paradigm interplay to reveal what is, crucially, 
left unsaid by the literature on megaproject governance.
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